We consider the Gaussian wiretap channel, where two legitimate players Alice and Bob communicate over an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, while Eve is eavesdropping, also through an AWGN channel. We propose a coding strategy based on lattice coset encoding. We analyze Eve's probability of decoding, from which we define the secrecy gain as a design criterion for wiretap lattice codes, expressed in terms of the lattice theta series, which characterizes Eve's confusion as a function of the channel parameters. The secrecy gain is studied for even unimodular lattices, and an asymptotic analysis shows that it grows exponentially in the dimension of the lattice. Examples of wiretap lattice codes are given. Interestingly, minimizing Eve's probability of error involves the same optimization of the theta series as does the flatness factor, another newly defined code design that characterizes lattice codes that achieve strong secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was introduced by Wyner [34] as a discrete memoryless broadcast channel where the sender, Alice, transmits confidential messages to a legitimate receiver Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. Wyner defined the perfect secrecy capacity as the maximum amount of information that Alice can send to Bob while insuring that Eve gets a negligible amount of information. He also described a generic coding strategy known as coset coding, used to encode together both data and random bits to confuse the eavesdropper. The question of determining the secrecy capacity of many classes of channels has been addressed extensively recently, yielding a plethora of information theoretical results on secrecy capacity [19] . In particular, the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel is known, and was established in [18] .
There is a sharp contrast with the situation of wiretap code designs, where very little is known.
Ozarow and Wyner proposed the so-called wire-tap II codes [25] for a scenario where the channel to Bob is a noiseless binary channel, while Eve experiences erasures. Recently polar wiretap codes have been proposed for symmetric binary input channels [22] , [12] . The most exploited approach to get practical codes so far has been to use LDPC codes, for binary erasure and symmetric channels (for example [32] ), but also for Gaussian channels with binary inputs [17] .
In this work, we consider lattice codes for Gaussian channels, where Alice uses lattice coset encoding.
Lattice codes for Gaussian channels have been considered from an information theoretical point of view in [11] in the setting of cooperative jamming, and more recently in [20] , [21] , where lattice codes have been considered for respectively the mod Λ Gaussian wiretap channel, and the Gaussian wiretap channel.
Both papers propose the so-called flatness factor as a new design criterion, and [21] proves that nested lattice codes can achieve semantic and strong secrecy over the Gaussian wiretap channel. We focus here on a code design criterion, which we derive from minimizing Eve's probability of correctly decoding.
More precisely, a wiretap lattice code consists of a pair of nested lattices Λ e ⊂ Λ b , where Λ b is a lattice designed to ensure reliability for Bob, while Λ e is a sublattice of Λ b that increases Eve's confusion. We show that Eve's probability P c,e of correctly decoding a message intended to Bob is bounded by a function that depends on the noise on Eve's channel, and on the theta series of the lattice Λ e at a particular point.
Interestingly, the theta series at that same point also provides an upper bound on the mutual information between Alice's message and Eve's received message [21] . Mimicking the way the coding gain quantifies how much reliability a particular coding strategy brings with respect to uncoded transmission, we define the secrecy gain to quantify how much confusion a specific lattice provides compared to using the Z n lattice. An asymptotic study of the secrecy gain and wiretap lattice codes are further presented.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II recalls the channel model, how lattice coset encoding is performed, while Section III contains an analysis of Eve's probability of correctly decoding, from which design criteria are deduced. The notion of secrecy gain is defined, illustrated and interpreted in Section IV. It is further analyzed for even unimodular lattices in Section V. The asymptotic analysis which describes the behavior of the secrecy gain when the lattice dimension grows is presented in Section VI.
Finally some wiretap lattice codes can be found in Section VII.
II. CODING SCHEME FOR THE GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL

A. The Gaussian Wiretap Channel
We consider a Gaussian wiretap channel, that is, a broadcast channel where the source (Alice) sends a signal to a legitimate receiver (Bob), while an illegitimate eavesdropper (Eve) can listen to the transmission. It is modeled by
where x is the transmitted signal, v b and v e denote the Gaussian noise at Bob, respectively Eve's side, both with zero mean, and respective variance σ 2 b and σ 2 e (see Figure 1 ). We assume that Alice knows Bob's channel, that is σ b , as well as Eve's channel, σ e , though we will also show how to handle the case where Eve's channel is unknown (see Section VII). Alice's encoder maps l bits s 1 , . . . , s l from S = {0, 1} to a codeword x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n , and over a transmission of n symbols, we get
We consider the case where Alice uses lattice codes, namely x ∈ Λ b , where Λ b is an n-dimensional real lattice (we use the subscript b to refer to the intended legitimate receiver Bob). She then encodes her l bits into a point x ∈ Λ b : s = (s 1 , . . . , s l ) ∈ {0, 1} l → x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ Λ b .
Note that since Alice encodes a finite number l of bits per codeword, she needs to choose a finite subset of Λ b . The problem of finding a shaping region R is not addressed here.
We recall for the sake of completeness that a lattice Λ is a discrete set of points in R n , which can be described in terms of its generator matrix M by [24] , [6] 
where the m rows of M form a linearly independent set of vectors in R n (so that m ≤ n) which form a basis of the lattice. To every lattice Λ is associated its dual lattice Λ ⋆ defined as follows.
Definition 1: Let Λ be a lattice with generator matrix M . We call its dual lattice the lattice Λ ⋆ with generator matrix (M −1 ) T .
For any lattice point P i of a lattice Λ ⊂ R n , its Voronoi cell is defined by
All Voronoi cells are the same, thus
The volume of a lattice Λ with generator matrix M is by definition the volume vol(V(Λ)) of a Voronoi cell, that is
B. Wyner's Coset Encoding
In order to confuse the eavesdropper, we use coset coding, as proposed in [34] , [25] . The idea is that instead of having a one-to-one correspondence between a vector of information bits and a lattice point, this vector of information bits is mapped to a set of codewords, namely a coset, after which the point to be actually transmitted is chosen randomly inside the coset. Consequently, k bits (k ≤ l) of s ∈ {0, 1} l will carry the information and l − k bits, the randomness.
More precisely, we partition the lattice Λ b into a union of disjoint cosets of the form
with Λ e a sublattice of Λ b and c an n-dimensional vector. We need 2 k cosets to be labeled by the information vector s d ∈ {0, 1} k :
which means that Once the mapping
is done, Alice randomly chooses a point x ∈ Λ e + c j(sd) and sends it over the wiretap channel. This is equivalent to choose a random vector r ∈ Λ e . The transmitted lattice point x ∈ Λ b is finally of the form
We have denoted the sublattice Λ e , since it encodes the random bits that are there to increase Eve's confusion, and is then the lattice intended for Eve.
The total rate R is then
where R s is the information bits rate intended to Bob, and R e is the random bit rate, all per (complex) channel use:
where r is the number of random bits.
Intuitively, the meaning of this coding scheme is that we would like Eve to decode perfectly the lattice Λ e whose points are labeled by the random bits. This corresponds to the information-theoretic approach [19] where it is shown that the secrecy capacity is equal to the difference between Bob's capacity and Eve's and thus, it is desirable that Eve's capacity is wasted in decoding random bits.
Example 1:
Assume that the channel between Alice and Eve is corrupted by an additive uniform noise.
Even though this is not a realistic channel this perfectly illustrates the coset coding strategy. We will see that, in this case, it is enough to consider the Z lattice.
Consider the one-dimensional case (see Figure 2) where Alice sends one point x ∈ Z. Eve receives
where v is uniformly distributed over the interval − m 2 , m 2 for some m ∈ Z, as shown on the upper left Figure 2 . To confuse Eve, Alice performs coset coding as follows:
• she performs the Euclidean division
where the quotient q carries the random symbols while the remainder r carries the data.
• she encodes random symbols using points in mZ (the quotient q) while data symbols are mapped to elements of Z/mZ (the remainder r). This is illustrated in the upper right and the lower parts of Figure 2 . Now, as it can be seen in Figure 2 , Eve is able to detect with a zero-error probability the value of q in Equation (5) while all possible values of r will be detected with probability 1 m . This means that random symbols will be detected error-free when the confusion will be maximal for data symbols already when we use a one-dimensional lattice (that is n = 1).
Unfortunately, Gaussian noise is not bounded: it requires to use n−dimensional lattice codes. Table   1 recalls the one-dimensional approach and shows the equivalent lattices with their respective cosets in the multi-dimensional approach required by the Gaussian channel. 
and its cosets 2Z 2 + (0, 1) = {(2x, 2y + 1), x, y ∈ Z},
2Z
2 + (1, 1) = {(2x + 1, 2y + 1), x, y ∈ Z},
We note that if we take the union of 2Z 2 and its 3 cosets, we recover the lattice Z 2 :
This is shown in Figure 3 , where 2Z 2 is represented by the triangles, 2Z 2 + (0, 1) by the squares, 2Z 2 + (1, 1) by the circles, and finally 2Z 2 + (1, 0) by the stars. Alice wants to communicate a message to Bob using the Gaussian wiretap channel given in (1) . Assume that she can use 2 bits per channel use, she can then label any of the above 4 cosets, say
To transmit the two bits 01, she then randomly picks a point in the coset 2Z 2 + (0, 1), say (2, 3), and sends this point over the wiretap channel.
An interesting point to develop is the comparison, in terms of probability of correct decision for Eve, between the scheme proposed here and the classical scheme using a 4 − QAM constellation, that is, only using the symbols in the central square of Figure 3 , to illustrate that coset coding does increase the confusion at the eavesdropper. For the classical 4 − QAM constellation, the symbol probability of correct decision, at Eve's end, is given by [26] 
where E b is the energy per bit and N 0 = σ 2 e is the noise variance. Q(x) is, as usual the error function defined as
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• Decompose the QAM constellation into its real and imaginary parts so that P c,e = Pr {x = x} = Pr {x 1 = x 1 } Pr {x 2 = x 2 } where x = x 1 + ix 2 is the transmitted QAM symbol andx is the detected QAM symbol. By symmetry of the constellation, we have
Pr {x = x} .
• Now, as can be seen on Figure 3 Pr
• By summing over all coset representatives, we finally get that the probability of correct decision for Eve is
where θ = As an illustration, P c,e as computed in (8) is plotted in Figure 2 with the probability of correct decision for Eve when using a 4−QAM constellation. We observe that, if the SNR is either too big (above 15 dB) or too small (below -13 dB), there is no gain in using the coset scheme. Indeed, when the SNR goes below -13 dB, the size of the sphere of noise is such that it includes too many representatives of the correct coset, so that Eve's probability of guessing the coset that was sent is not negligible anymore.
The example above shows the benefit of using coset encoding. However, it also illustrates that P c,e is no less than 0.3. We need to bring this threshold as low as possible (ideally tending to 0). This can be done by using multidimensional lattice coding in high dimension.
C. Lattice Coset Coding using Construction A
There are several ways of getting lattice coset codes. We will consider the so-called binary construction
A [8] with binary codes. Take the standard lattice Z n ∈ R n and reduce it modulo 2 :
Let C be a linear binary code with parameters (n, κ, d), that is a map from {0, 1} κ to {0, 1} n with minimum Hamming distance d. We can partition an n-dimensional lattice Λ as follows:
This is also equivalent to say that Λ is the preimage of C in Z n : Λ = ρ −1 (C).
Example 2 falls in this category. Take the universe code C with parameters (2, 2, 1), given explicitly by {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. Then
Another 2-dimensional example is given by the checkerboard lattice D 2 , formed by integer vectors
A more interesting example is the construction of the Schäffli lattice D 4 , formed by (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) such that x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 is even:
where (4, 3, 2) is the parity-check binary code of length 4, dimension 3 and minimum distance 2.
III. PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
A. Coset Decoding
After transmission over the Gaussian wiretap channel, Bob and Eve receive respectively (see (1) and
where we recall that r ∈ Λ e encodes the random bits, and c is the coset representative of minimum energy labeled by the information bits. Both Bob and Eve are interested in decoding the information bits, namely in finding the correct coset that was sent. To do so, they need to find the closest lattice point in Λ b to their respective received signal y or z, from which they deduce the coset to which it corresponds. Now when transmitting a codeword x in Λ ⊂ R n with Voronoi cell V Λ (x) over an additive white
Gaussian noise channel with noise variance σ 2 , the decoder makes the correct decision if and only if the noisy vector y is in V Λ (x), an event of probability
2 dy.
In our scenario, the probability P c of correct decision concerns not just one point but a coset, and thus it is the probability that the received signal lies in the union of the Voronoi regions of Λ b , translated by points of Λ e . Suppose that the lattice point x = r + c ∈ Λ b has been transmitted, with r ∈ Λ e ∩ R ⊂ Λ b , where R is the shaping region of the constellation. The probability P c of finding the correct coset is thus,
Since all terms in the sum of Equation (9) are positive, we can upperbound it by extending the summation over the whole lattice Λ e , which gives
If we take M codewords from Λ b , then and by doing the change of variable, u = y − x − t we get
Accordingly, the probability P c,b of Bob's (resp. P c,e of Eve's) correct decision is:
Since Bob's received vector y is most likely to lie in the Voronoi region of Λ b around the transmitted point (Alice chooses Λ b to fit Bob's channel), the terms in t different from 0 in (11) are negligible, which yields:
This is now the familiar case of transmitting lattice points over the Gaussian channel, for which it is known that Λ b should have a good Hermite parameter, to get a good coding gain [6] .
B. Eve's Probability of Correct Decision
By (12), we need to evaluate
where t ∈ Λ e . By denoting
the Poisson formula for lattices (see (52) in the appendix) yields that
where Λ ⋆ is the dual lattice of Λ (see Definition 1). We next computef (t ⋆ ), which by definition iŝ
This yields
by noting that the sine term of the exponential averages out to zero when summing over all lattice points, and
Now the cosine term takes it maximum value (that is 1) when u ∈ Λ, and we further get
To obtain an expression which depends on Λ instead of Λ ⋆ , we denote this time
and the Poisson formula for lattices (see (52) in the appendix) now gives that
using that (15) . Finally the probability of making a correct decision for Eve is summarized by
We can equivalently rewrite it in terms of generalized SNR (GSNR) γ Λe (σ e ) as
where
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We know how to design good codes for Bob's channel, and have his probability of making a correct decision arbitrarily close to 1. Our aim is thus to minimize the probability P c,e of Eve making a correct decision, while keeping P c,b unchanged. This is equivalent to minimize (16) , that is to find a lattice Λ b which is as good as possible for the Gaussian channel [6] , and which contains a sublattice Λ e such that minimize w.r. Λ e t∈Λe e − t
/2σ
2 e under the constraint log 2 |Λ b /Λ e | = k.
The constraint on the cardinality of cosets (or rate) is equivalent to set the fundamental volume of Λ e equal to a constant.
It is natural to start by approximating the sum of exponentials by its terms of higher order, namely
where τ (Λ e ) is the kissing number of Λ e which counts the number of vectors of length d min (Λ e ). Thus as a first criterion, we should maximize d min (Λ e ) while preserving the fundamental volume of Λ e , which is equivalent to require for Λ e to have a good Hermite parameter
after which we should minimize its kissing number. However we cannot be content with this approximation, and have to obtain a more precise analysis as will be shown later on.
IV. THE SECRECY GAIN: A DESIGN CRITERION
Let us get back to the code design criterion (19) and rewrite it in terms of the theta series of the lattice considered. Recall that given a lattice Λ ⊂ R n , its theta series Θ Λ is defined by [6] 
Example 3: Let us compute the theta series of Z n :
Exceptional lattices have theta series that can be expressed as functions of the Jacobi theta functions
A few examples of theta series of exceptional lattices [6] are given in Table II .
Checkerboard lattice Dn
Leech lattice Λ24 Thus to minimize Eve's probability of correct decision is equivalent to minimize Θ Λe (z) in z = i/2πσ 2 e , under the constraint that log 2 |Λ b /Λ e | = k. To approach this problem, let us set y = −iz and restrict to real positive values of y. We are now interested in minimizing
over all possible Λ e , in the particular value of y corresponding to z = i/2πσ 2 e , namely
Remark 1: From an information theory point of view, the information leaked to the eavesdropper is measured in terms of equivocation, that is H(S l |Z n ), where S and Z denote random variables corresponding respectively to the data and the message received by Eve. The best possible secrecy is achieved when H(S l |Z n ) = H(S l ), or equivalently when
How to design codes using the mutual information I(S l ; Z n ) as a characterization of secrecy is not yet well understood. Recent progresses appeared in [21, Theorem 5] , where it was shown for the Gaussian wiretap channel that
where [21, Proposition 1]
and γ Λe (σ e ) is the generalized signal-to-noise ratio defined in (18) . Both this information theory approach and our error probability approach agree on the fact that Θ Λe (1/2πσ 2 e ), that is the theta series of the lattice Λ e intended for Eve at the point 1/2πσ 2 e should be minimized. This bound is computed assuming a specific coding scheme, which takes into account a power constraint. Note that when we let the power grow, which corresponds to the scenario of the current paper, the way Alice encodes her message corresponds to choosing a point uniformly at random in a given coset, as is the case here. The interested reader may refer to [21] for the connection between the flatness factor ǫ Λe(σe) and the notion of strong secrecy.
A. Definition of Strong and Weak Secrecy Gains
Mimicking the way the coding gain captures the benefit of a good coding strategy with respect to no coding in terms of probability of error, we introduce the (strong) secrecy gain to characterize how a good lattice Λ e increases the confusion at the eavesdropper, compared to choosing Λ e = Z n .
Definition 2:
The strong secrecy gain χ Λ,strong of an n−dimensional lattice Λ is defined by
where Ξ Λ (y) is the secrecy function of Λ, defined as follows.
Definition 3: Let Λ be an n−dimensional lattice of volume λ n . The secrecy function of Λ is given by
defined for y > 0.
These definitions deserve several observations.
Remark 2:
1) The problem of minimizing Θ Λe (y) under the rate constraint log 2 |Λ b /Λ e | = k means that the optimization must be performed among lattices with the same volume. To do so, we fix as reference a scaled version of the cubic lattice λZ n , where λ is a scaling factor which guarantees that Λ e and λZ n have the same fundamental volume, namely, λ = n vol(V(Λ e )).
2) We are interested in the secrecy function at the chosen point y = 1 2πσ 2 e . However, by considering σ 2 e as a variable, and since we want to minimize the expression of Eve's probability of correct decision in (19) , it makes sense to further maximize the secrecy function over y > 0.
3) The secrecy function depends on σ 2 e . When Eve's channel is very noisy, there is no need for a subtle coding strategy (Λ e = Z n will do), and vice-versa, when Eve's channel is too good, wiretap coding cannot help (Λ e = Z n will again do). This is illustrated on Figure 5 where the behavior of the theta series of Z 80 and of another lattice Λ 80 1 , both multiplied by the generalized SNR (GSNR), are compared, as a function of the GSNR (see (18)). As a consequence, the secrecy function of a given lattice Λ being the ratio of its theta series and the theta series of λZ n captures the region where wiretap coding is most meaningful, and provides an approximation of the ratio of the respective probabilities of correct decision.
Since the maximum value in Definition 2 is not easy to calculate for a general lattice, we also introduce a weaker definition of secrecy gain. By (multiplicative) symmetry point, we mean a point y 0 such that for all y > 0. We remark that the variable y appears in the exponent, explaining the multiplicative notation. One could alternatively express the symmetry point in terms of log y and log y 0 , yielding Ξ Λ (log y 0 + log y) = Ξ Λ (log y 0 − log y).
Definition 4:
Suppose that Λ is an n-dimensional lattice, whose secrecy function has a symmetry point y 0 . Then the weak secrecy gain χ Λ of Λ is given by
where we recall that λ = vol(V(Λ))
B. Lattices Equivalent to their Duals
Let us consider the class of lattices Λ such that Λ is equivalent to its dual Λ ⋆ , that is, the dual lattice Λ ⋆ can be obtained from the lattice Λ by (possibly) a rotation, reflection, and change of scale α > 0:
In fact, if Λ ∼ αΛ ⋆ , then α cannot be any positive number. Indeed, we deduce from the equivalence between both lattices that
But since Λ and Λ ⋆ are dual, then
.
From these two equalities, we get
If α = 1, we say that Λ is isodual. Alternatively
Definition 5:
A lattice is isodual if it can be obtained from its dual by (possibly) a rotation or reflection.
If M is the generator matrix of Λ and (M −1 ) T the one of its dual, this means that
where U is a matrix with integer entries and determinant ±1 and B is a real orthogonal matrix. Thus the Gram matrix G of Λ, which is by definition G = M M T , is related to the Gram matrix of its dual
A simple example of isodual lattice is Z n , since its generator matrix M = I n , and the one of its dual is (M −1 ) T = I n , and both Gram matrices are the n-dimensional identity I n . It follows from the definition of Λ isodual that Θ Λ (y) = Θ Λ ⋆ (y), since the theta series depends on the norm ||x|| 2 , x ∈ Λ, which does not change by rotation or reflection of the lattice. We are now ready to establish the weak secrecy gain of isodual lattices.
Proposition 1:
The secrecy function of an isodual lattice has a multiplicative symmetry point at y = 1.
Proof:
The secrecy function of an isodual lattice Λ and the one of its dual Λ ⋆ are the same:
Jacobi's formula (53) gives, using that Z n and Λ are isodual and have thus volume 1, that
This shows that y 0 = 1 is a multiplicative symmetry point for the secrecy function, which concludes the proof.
Consider again a lattice Λ equivalent to its dual, though not necessarily isodual. The above result easily extends to this case.
Proposition 2:
The weak secrecy gain of a lattice equivalent to its dual is achieved at
Proof: We can in fact always scale the lattice Λ as
1 n Λ so that Λ ′ is isodual. Now, since the theta series of a scaled lattice is
with here β = vol(V(Λ)) −1 , we deduce that
which shows the existence, for Ξ Λ , of a multiplicative symmetry point at y 0 = vol(V(Λ))
Conjecture 1: For a lattice equivalent to its dual, the weak secrecy gain and the strong secrecy gain coincide. In particular, this means that the secrecy function of isodual lattices achieves its maximum at
Note that a related problem has been addressed in [7] : for a fixed dimension n, find the lattice that minimizes Θ Λ (y) for some value y. Unfortunately, the obtained results hold for values of y belonging to a range which is not of interest.
This conjecture is checked below for the lattices E 8 and D 4 .
C. Some Examples
a) The Gosset Lattice E 8 : The Gosset lattice is a famous 8-dimensional lattice which can be described by vectors of the form (x 1 , . . . , x 8 ), x i ∈ Z, or x i ∈ Z + 1/2, such that
This lattice can be obtained by construction A as
where (8, 4, 4) is the Reed-Müller code of length 8 and dimension 4, that is the extended binary Hamming (7, 4) code. E 8 is an isodual lattice and its theta series is given in Table II . As it is isodual, the symmetry point of its secrecy function is y 0 = 1. Figure 6 gives the secrecy function of E 8 . The symmetric point is also the point at which the secrecy function is maximized. In all plots of the secrecy function, the horizontal axis will give y in decibels (10 log 10 (y)) to enlighten the symmetry point. Here, a multiplicative symmetry point equal to 1 is, of course, represented by an additive symmetry point equal to 0 dB. We remark that the weak and the strong secrecy gains coincide. b) The Schäffli lattice D 4 : D 4 is a 4−dimensional lattice which is not isodual, but it is equivalent to its dual. Its fundamental volume is 2. This lattice can be obtained by construction A as
where (4, 3, 2) is the binary parity-check code of length 4. The theta series of D 4 is also given in Table II .
The multiplicative symmetry point is now
. Figure 7 gives its secrecy function with a symmetry point equal to −1.5 dB corresponding to 10 log 10 1 √ 2
. For this lattice also, the weak and the strong secrecy gains again coincide. 
D. Operating Point of a Lattice
We are interested in how the secrecy gain is related to the parameters of the Gaussian channel, through the proposed lattice coset construction. We restrict this discussion to lattices which are equivalent to their dual. In this case, from a system point of view, it is always possible to scale these lattices to normalize their volume to 1, in which case we obtain isodual lattices, which we showed have a symmetry point at y = 1 (see Proposition 1). Thanks to Conjecture 1, we will use the weak secrecy gain instead of the strong one for isodual lattices and assume that we want the communication system to work at the value y = 1.
In practice, this is obtained by scaling suitably the lattice Λ e for which we define correspondingly its operating point y o.p. as
n . As an example, we see on Figure 8 how the operating point of scaled versions of E 8 behaves with respect to the one of
that is −6m dB.
To fit the transmission rate, under the constraint (2) , that is
the fundamental volume of Λ e is scaled as
n . Now, the average energy per complex symbol and per complex channel use if Alice sends a Q − QAM constellation with Q = 2 R points and minimum distance 2a is [10] 
This can be easily extended to a (Q − QAM ) n 2 constellation, which can be seen as a cubically shaped subset of the n-dimensional lattice 2aZ n :
where [Λ] is a notation to refer to a cubically shaped subset of the lattice Λ. Now assuming that a finite constellation is carved from Λ b with a cubic shaping, its average energy E s ([Λ b ]) differs from the one of Z n by its coding gain, which shows that we can approximate the energy per complex channel use and per complex symbol of the signal sent by Alice by
Hence, we get
which with y o.p. = and finally
where γ e = E s /σ 2 e is Eve's signal to noise ratio. This corresponds to a secrecy rate
V. THE SECRECY GAIN OF UNIMODULAR LATTICES
Theta series are difficult to analyze in general, but nevertheless they have nice properties for some families of lattices, such as even unimodular lattices, which we will study in this section.
Let Λ be a lattice with generator matrix M and Gram matrix G = M M T .
Definition 6: [8, Chap. 1] A lattice Λ is unimodular if 1) Λ is integral, i.e., its Gram matrix has entries in Z,
It is furthermore even unimodular (or of type II) if
Note that a unimodular lattice has fundamental volume equal to 1. Unimodular lattices are in particular isodual lattices, for which the weak secrecy gain is reached in y = 1, or log y = 0 (see Proposition 1), and conjectured to be equal to the strong secrecy gain. We start by giving two examples of computations of the weak secrecy gain Ξ(1) for two exceptional even unimodular lattices E 8 and Λ 24 .
A. The Secrecy Gain of Two Exceptional Unimodular Lattices
The most important formulas we will use are related to Jacobi theta functions (22)- (24) and can be found in [33] . They are
Gosset Lattice E 8 : We evaluate the value of the secrecy function Ξ E8 at the point y = 1 ( Figure 6 displays the secrecy function of E 8 ). From Table II , we have that
It is easier to look at (Ξ E8 (y)) −1 , which we evaluate in y = 1:
using (28). We thus deduce that the secrecy gain of E 8 is χ E8 = Ξ E8 (1) = 4 3 = 1.33333 Table II , we get The secrecy function of Λ 24 is shown on Figure 9 .
B. Theta series of Even Unimodular Lattices
The theory of theta series of even unimodular lattices is well established 2 . We first give some definitions that will be useful for the calculation of the secrecy gain.
Definition 7:
Consider the following two series
and
where B k are the Bernoulli numbers [29] defined by
k is an integer such that k ≥ 2, ζ is the Riemann zeta function, and q = e iπz , Im(z) > 0. These series are referred to 3 as Eisenstein series [8, Chap. 2, §5].
Note that these definitions hold for even k ′ , so that depending on the notations, one can write either k ′ even, or as we choose here k ′ = 2k, for k a positive integer. Furthermore, the argument q can be either q = e iπz or q = e 2iπz . Since so far we have always used q = e iπ , we keep this notation but then have to introduce a power of 2 in the exponent of q.
The Riemann zeta function ζ and the Bernoulli numbers are related by
and it is known [29] that B 4 = −1/30, B 6 = 1/42. This allows us to compute that
We call
the function that appears in the above computation, up to a factor of (2π) 12 [8, Chap. 2, §5], which is called the modular discriminant 4 .
Remarkably, theta series of all even unimodular lattices can be expressed as polynomials in the two variables E 4 (q) and ∆(q):
If Λ is an even unimodular lattice of dimension n, then 1) n = 24m + 8k, for some positive integer m, and some k ∈ {0, 1, 2} (as a consequence, n is a multiple of 8),
2) its theta series can be expressed, given k, m in 1), as
3 The expression we use here as a definition is classically derived as a Fourier transform of another expression:
Different authors may or may not include the factor (2π)
12 in the definition of modular discriminant.
Proof:
The proof can be found in [8] .
Now the two "base" series E 4 (q) and ∆(q) are simply related to the Jacobi theta functions as [6] 
Equations (33) and (32) can be used to obtain a relation between the secrecy gain of an even unimodular lattice Λ of dimension n = 24m + 8k, on the one hand, and the ratios
3 (e −π ) on the other hand, since
and thus
We can further deduce that Theorem 1: The (weak) secrecy gain of an even unimodular lattice is a rational number.
Proof: Note that
and using (33) and (28), we get
The proof then follows from Equation (34). for some coefficients α j , β j , we have from (32) that
C. Extremal Even Unimodular Lattices
for an even unimodular lattice. In order for it to be extremal, we set the coefficients γ j = 0, j = 1, . . . , m, which yields a linear system of m equations with m unknowns given by b 1 , . . . , b m . We then obtain the following development of the theta series of Λ:
and consequently as upperbound for the minimum norm of Λ:
Unimodular lattices achieving the upperbound (35) are called extremal and their theta series, determined by solving the above system of linear equations in b j , are called extremal theta series. They are given in Table III for dimensions 8 to 80. We notice that there is only one extremal theta series for a given dimension. Note that knowing the theta series does not give the corresponding lattice.
We compute further values of secrecy gains for some extremal even unimodular lattices in higher dimensions. The corresponding secrecy functions are shown on Figure 10 , while the different secrecy gains are summarized in Table IV. 1) Barnes-Wall lattice BW 32 : A 32-dimensional extremal lattice is the Barnes-Wall lattice BW 32 . Its theta series is and finally its secrecy gain is χ BW32 = 64 9 ≃ 7.11 .
2) Lattice P 48p(q) : There are two different extremal even unimodular lattices in dimension 48, P 48p
and P 48q [6, Chap. 5], having, of course the same theta series: We use the computation of the secrecy gain in dimension 80 to illustrate two claims made earlier.
1) We saw, in Equation (20), the following approximation of the theta series:
If we were to use this approximation to compute the secrecy gain, we would get
instead of 379.57. This illustrates the importance of considering the whole theta series.
2) Since the secrecy gain approximates the ratio of the respective probabilities of correct decision, we have that P c,e Z 80 P c,e (Λ 80 ) ≈ χ Λ80 ≈ 380.
We thus reduce Eve's probability of correct decision of a factor of 380 by using Λ 80 instead of
VI. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF THE SECRECY GAIN FOR EVEN UNIMODULAR LATTICES
In this section, we provide an asymptotic analysis of the secrecy gain χ Λ for even unimodular lattices
We first give a lower bound on the maximal value of χ Λ over all even unimodular n−dimensional lattices, which only depends on the dimension n, after which we show more generally that as n grows, the secrecy gain itself only depends on n, and not on the choice of a particular unimodular lattice.
A. A lower bound on the maximal secrecy gain
We propose here a lower bound on the theta series of unimodular lattices that maximizes the secrecy gain, as a function of the dimension n. We then let n grow to get an asymptotic bound. This result relies on the following Siegel-Weil formula for theta series of even unimodular lattices.
Theorem 2: [29] Let n ≡ 0(mod 8), Ω n be the set of all inequivalent even unimodular n−dimensional
is the Eisenstein series (29) 6 , and Aut(Λ) refers to the group of automorphisms of Λ.
where [33] 
5 Theta series of even unimodular lattices are in fact modular forms for the whole modular group SL2 (Z), and all the results explained in this section actually rely on that property, though we are trying to use it as little as possible so as to make the paper accessible for people who are not familiar with the theory of modular forms.
to get
and for k = 4k ′ a multiple of 4, we have
An asymptotic expression of the Bernoulli number |B 4k ′ | is
Now, as e 2π ≈ 535.5 ≫ 1, we use
where Li s (x) is the polylogarithm function defined as [2] Li
Now, we use the identity [2]
where ζ(s, x) is the so-called Hurwitz zeta function [1] . Combining the 3 equations below
with Equation (38), we get
Now we are ready to conclude. We combine Equations (36), (37) and (39) to obtain
Since n = 4k ′ , we finally conclude that
which grows exponentially in n. This proves that there exists a family of even unimodular lattices whose secrecy gains exponentially grows up with the dimension, which means that Eve's probability of correct decision exponentially tends to 0. But as we can remark in Figure 10 , around its maximum, the secrecy function becomes sharper and sharper when n grows, meaning that for high dimensions, the communication system absolutely has to operate at the operating point (y = 1 for unimodular lattices).
B. Behavior of the secrecy gain when n grows
Let us now look at the behavior of the secrecy gain when n grows, which depends on the theta series of the corresponding even unimodular lattice Λ of dimension n, a multiple of 8. The main result used here is that the theta series of Λ is given by [14, Chap. 11 ]
where E k (q) is the Eisenstein series given in (29) with k = n/2 and S k,Λ (q) is a function (a so-called cusp form) whose Fourier decomposition is of the form
where the Fourier coefficients behave as [28, Chap. 1]
+ǫ .
On the other hand, the Fourier decomposition of the Eisenstein series is
where σ k−1 (m) = d|m d k−1 is the divisor function which behaves as
By combining both Fourier coefficient estimations, we obtain that the Fourier coefficients of the theta series Θ Λ (q) in (41), when n becomes large enough, is dominated by the Eisenstein series which only depends on the dimension n. Consequently, when n grows, the theta series of all even unimodular lattices behave like the Eisenstein series E k (q), which, in terms of secrecy gain χ Λ , means
for any n−dimensional (n large enough) even unimodular lattice Λ.
VII. WIRETAP LATTICE CODES
We conclude this paper by giving some examples of code construction.
A. An 8-dimensional 2-level nested lattice code construction
Suppose that Alice communicates with Bob using an 8-dimensional lattice. She needs to decide both Λ b , that encodes bits for Bob, and Λ e , that contains random bits intended for Eve. She can take Λ b = E 8 , since this lattice has the best coding gain (Hermite constant) in dimension 8 [6] . Based on her knowledge of Bob's SNR, γ b = E s /σ 2 b , and Bob's desired error probability, Alice decides the shaping region R and thus, the total rate R = R e + R s of transmission.
Now Λ e has to be a sublattice of E 8 , which first optimizes the secrecy gain. Since E 8 is an extremal lattice, all its scaled versions reach the lower bound on the maximal secrecy gain χ 8 and consequently, we pick Λ e = 2 m E 8 . Note that the scaling factor has to be a power of 2 since Λ e has to be a sublattice of Λ b = E 8 . This further quantizes the rate R s as follows:
and we have from (27) that
Thus since we are under the assumption that Alice knows Eve's SNR, γ e , she accordingly decides how many random bits to send. For example γ e (dB) = 10 dB, R e ≃ 0.67
Of course, the better Eve's SNR, the more random bits are needed. Now, R is fixed by Bob's SNR while R e is given by Eve's SNR which constraints the data rate to be
For example, if R ≈ 6 bits and Eve has a SNR of γ e = 20 dB, then Alice can send R s = 2 bits per complex channel use, which means that Λ e = 2E 8 .
The encoding is done via construction A, as explained in Section II. First as already seen earlier, 
We denote by C † the quotient code C † = F 8 2 /C, or equivalently
so that (43) becomes
Combining with
(8, 4, 4), we finally obtain a construction of E 8 using 2E 8 :
Now the k = 8 bits of information are used to encode (8, 4, 4) + 2C † (4 bits for (8, 4, 4) and 4 bits for 2C † ). The 16 random bits on the other hand label 2E 8 . The encoding can be done again via construction A, since we have from (42) that
for which we need 4 random bits for √ 2 · (8, 4, 4) and the rest for 4Z 8 (in particular, we need a minimum of 4 random bits).
B. An 8-dimensional N -level nested lattice code construction
In the above example, Alice could choose the number of random bits to be sent since she knew Eve's SNR. Suppose now a scenario where Alice perfectly knows Bob's SNR but has no idea of Eve's SNR, actually Alice does not even need to know that Eve is present. In this case, the idea we want to develop is that Alice can decide a hierarchy of secret bits, ranking the data bits from the most secret to the least, and encode them accordingly. In this case, the role of the random bits in the coset coding scheme is played by the least secure bits, whose cardinality depends on Eve's SNR. This idea has been formulated, from an information theoretic point of view, in [30] .
We now illustrate this idea by extending the example of Subsection VII-A.
First, we need a tower of nested lattices in dimension 8 [13] . We give in Table V 
As all codes used in Table V are nested codes, all constructed lattices are nested lattices satisfying
Since this nested chain is periodic (2Z 8 is just a scaled version of Z 8 ), we can shift it in such a way that we obtain the chain
While in Subsection VII-A we considered
we now get the same two nested (and scaled) lattices but with a finer chain of lattices in between.
To transmit k information bits to Bob, that is
bits per complex channel use, Alice chooses again Λ b = E 8 , and needs
For instance, to send k = 1 bit, Alice takes from (47) the lattice Λ e = L ⋆ 8 . Similarly, for k = 2 bits, she
Since Alice does not know Eve's SNR, she decides the total rate R, based on the channel to Bob.
Suppose that Alice wants to encode a sorted block of ℓ information bits s = (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s ℓ−1 ), where by sorted we mean that the bit order matters: the bits are ranked in decreasing order of confidentiality, that is the first bit is the most confidential. 
translated by a constant vector, depending on the constellation, so that the mean value of the constellation is 0.
Let us now see how it works. Let g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g 7 denote the rows of the matrix G. Thus,
and similarly
so that the final transmitted point of Equation (48) can now be written as
Indeed,
1) The vector g 0 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) / ∈ D 8 .
2) The term s 1 g 1 + s 2 g 2 + · · · + s 7 g 7 is in D 8 since the 7 × 8 matrix whose rows are g 1 , . . . , g 7 is the generator matrix of the (8, 7, 2) code which yields D 8 via construction A.
3) The last term is obviously in 2Z 8 which is contained in D 8 .
, else x ∈ D 8 + g 0 and the minimum squared Euclidean distance between D 8 and D 8 + g 0 is equal to 1 which is the minimum distance of Z 8 = Λ b . Consequently s 0 is the bit most sensitive to noise, that is the one with highest bit error probability. Note that, from a reliability point of view s 0 is the worst bit whereas it is the best one, from a security point of view.
Let us repeat the process. We have (8, 4, 4) , which, by construction A gives a lattice point in E 8 , after which the whole encoding procedure described for Z 8 holds.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered coding strategies based on lattices, for the Gaussian wiretap channel. From the expression of the eavesdropper probability of correct decision, we derived the so-called secrecy gain, a new lattice invariant related to theta series, which characterizes the amount of confusion that lattice coding introduces at the eavesdropper. Since theta series of even unimodular lattices are well-understood, we focused, in this paper, on the study of the secrecy gain of even unimodular lattices: we provided explicit examples and an asymptotic analysis which shows that the secrecy gain grows exponentially in the lattice dimension. Finally, worked out coding examples were given. 
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we review results that are needed to manipulate sums of periodic functions over lattices. In particular, we will detail the Poisson summation formula over lattices and the Jacobi formula.
Consider the function F (x) = m∈Z n f (m + x) which is periodic over [0, 1] n , for f a well-behaved function, that is satisfying [8] 1) R n |f (x)| dx < ∞
2)
m∈Z n |f (m + u)| converges uniformly for all u belonging to a compact subset of R n . It has a Fourier series F (x) = n∈Z n a n e 2πi n,x , where a n = wheref (n) is the Fourier transform of f , which is such that we can invert the sum and the integral in the second step, and reconstruct the integral in the fourth step. Thus 
where Λ ⋆ has generator matrix (M −1 ) T . The lattice Λ ⋆ is the dual lattice of Λ (see also Definition 1).
Let Θ Λ (y) = r∈Λ e −πy||r|| 2 be the theta series of Λ with generator matrix M , which we rewrite as Θ Λ (y) = r∈Λ f (r), so as to apply (52): 
connecting the theta series of a lattice and its dual.
